This article speculates about the future of the world economy 100 years from now. It argues that the spread of markets is restricted by the reach of jurisdictional boundaries, and that national sovereignty imposes serious constraints on international economic integration. The political trilemma of the world economy is that international economic integration, the nation-state, and mass politics cannot co-exist. We have to pick two out of three. The article predicts that it will be the nation-state system that disappears, with global federalism taking its place.
In a famous passage from The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Keynes (1920) drew a vivid picture of an integrated world economy at the pinnacle of the gold standard. While sipping his morning tea in bed, Keynes reminisced nostalgically, the Englishmen of his time could order by telephone various commodities of the world, invest in far-off places, purchase unlimited amounts of foreign currency or precious metals, and arrange for international travel without even requiring a passport. Keynes, who was writing in the aftermath of a devastating world war and was anticipating a period of economic turbulence and protectionism --correctly, as it turned out --considered this a lost era of great magnificence.
What will a latter-day Keynes, writing a century from now, say about today's global economy with its unparalleled prosperity and integration ( Figure 1) ? Will she bemoan, as the original Keynes did, its collapse into disarray and autarky yet again? Or will she look back at the tail end of the 20th century as the era that launched a new process of internationalization? Since economists rank second only to astrologers in their predictive abilities, the correct answer is that we have no idea. The best that one can do is speculate wildly, which is what I am about to do.
In these speculations, I will use the term "international economic integration" rather than "globalization," for two reasons. First, while not as trendy, it has a distinct meaning that will be self-evident to economists.
Globalization, by contrast, is a term that is used in different ways by different analysts. Second, the term "international economic integration" does not come with the value judgements --positive or negative --that the term "globalization" seems to trigger in knee-jerk fashion.
How Much More Integration Could There Be?
The natural benchmark for thinking about international economic integration is to consider a world in which markets for goods, services, and factors of production are perfectly integrated. How far are we presently from such a world?
The answer is that we are quite far. Contrary to conventional wisdom and much punditry, international economic integration remains remarkably limited. This robust finding comes across in a wide range of studies, too numerous to cite here. 1 National borders (such as the U.S.-Canadian one) seem to have a significantly depressing effect on commerce, even in the absence of formal tariff or non-tariff barriers, linguistic or cultural differences, exchange-rate uncertainty, and other economic obstacles. International price arbitrage in tradable commodities tends to occur very slowly.
Investment portfolios in the advanced industrial countries typically exhibit large amounts of "home bias": that is, people invest a higher proportion of assets in their own countries than the principles of asset diversification would seem to suggest. National investment rates remain highly This result is fondly known to the cognoscenti as the "impossible trinity," or in Obstfeld and Taylor's (1998) But global federalism is not the only way to achieve complete international economic integration. An alternative is to maintain the nation-state system largely as is, but to ensure that national jurisdictions --and the differences among them --do not get in the way of economic transactions.
The overarching goal of nation-states in this world would be to appear attractive to international markets. National jurisdictions, far from acting as an obstacle, would be geared towards facilitating international commerce and capital mobility. Domestic regulations and tax policies would be either harmonized according to international standards, or structured such that they pose the least amount of hindrance to international economic integration. The only local public goods provided would be those that are compatible with integrated markets.
It is possible to envisage a world of this sort; in fact, many commentators seem to believe we are already there.
Governments today actively compete with each other by pursuing policies that they believe will earn them market confidence and attract trade and capital inflows: tight money, small government, low taxes, flexible labor legislation, deregulation, privatization, and openness all around. These are the policies that comprise what Thomas Friedman (1999) has aptly termed the Golden Straitjacket.
The price of maintaining national jurisdictional sovereignty while markets become international is that politics have to be exercised over a much narrower domain. The bet is based on the following reasoning. First, continuing technological progress will both foster international economic integration and remove some of the traditional obstacles (such as distance) to global government.
Second, short of global wars or natural disasters of major proportions, it is hard to envisage that a substantial part of the world's population will want to give up the goodies that an increasingly integrated (hence efficient) world market can deliver. Third, hard-won citizenship rights (of representation and self-government) are also unlikely to be given up easily, keeping pressure on politicians to remain accountable to the wishes of their electorate.
The most dicey projection is that we shall see an alliance of convenience in favor of global governance between those who perceive themselves to be the "losers" from economic integration, like labor groups and environmentalists, and those who perceive themselves as the "winners," like exporters, multinational enterprises, and financial interests.
The alliance will be underpinned by the mutual realization that both sets of interests are best served by the supranational promulgation of rules, regulations, and standards. Labor advocates and environmentalists will get a shot at international labor and environmental rules.
Multinational enterprises will be able to operate under global accounting standards. Investors will benefit from common disclosure, bankruptcy, and financial regulations. A global fiscal authority will provide public goods and a global lender-of-last resort will stabilize the financial system. Part of the bargain will be to make international policy makers accountable through democratic elections, with due regard to the preeminence of the economically more powerful countries. National bureaucrats and politicians, the only remaining beneficiaries of the nation-state, will either refashion themselves as global officials or they will be shouldered aside.
Global federalism does not mean that the United Nations will turn itself into a world government. What we are likely to get is a combination of traditional forms of governance (an elected global legislative body) with regulatory institutions spanning multiple jurisdictions and accountable to perhaps multiple types of representative bodies. In an age of rapid technological change, the form of governance itself can be expected to be subject to considerable innovation.
Many things can go wrong with this scenario. One alternative possibility is that an ongoing series of financial crises will leave national electorates sufficiently shellshocked that they willingly, if unhappily, don the Golden Straitjacket for the long run. This scenario amounts to the Argentinization of national politics on a global scale.
Another possibility is that governments will resort to protectionism to deal with the distributive and governance difficulties posed by economic integration. That would be the backlash scenario. If I were making a prediction for the next 20 years rather than 100, I would regard either one of these scenarios as more likely than global federalism. But a longer time horizon leaves room for greater optimism. Now let me tell you about the Wars of Secession of 2120.
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